According to an anecdote, retold in Plato' s Theaetetus, the beginning of philosophy is marked by a threefold presence: a philosopher, a weIl, and a servant girl. Absorbed in the contemplation of celestial entities the frrst philosopher, Thales, does not notice terrestrial things and their abysses; but the objects of his negligence get their revenge when, because of his lack of attention, he falls into a weIl, while a servant girl, spectator to the scene, Symposium I, 1 (1997), 5-15 
laughs.
1 Why did Thales fall into the weIl, provoking the servant girl's laughter? Because he ignored that "we should first look around thoroughly in this round-about-us,"2 Heidegger comments.
If we look around we might notice, as Heidegger observes in a lecture he delivered in the early '50, that "near to us are what we usuaIly caIl things."3 However, the nearness of things has not facilitated the access to their being, which has remained and remains concealed -to science, which "always encounters only what its kind ofrepresentation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science" (T 170); to philosophy, which conceives ofthings in terms of substratum, materiality or ideas;4 and, one should add, also to Heidegger, who, despite his preoccupation with things ever since Being and Time, s has never confronted the issue with conclusive determination because always 'on the way' to something else: fundamental ontology, art, physis. Hence, the suspicion of his precipitation into the Thaletian weIl, whereas the maids of all times continue their laughter.
Yet, as in Plato' s cave, the reality of things casts its light even at the bottom 01" the weIl. Possibly as a consequence of the persistence of things which, in their nearness to us, are reluctant to being banished at the margins of philosophy, the question "what is a thing?" (T 166) imposes itself (once again) to Heidegger, more clearly and resolutely than ever, in aseries of later conferences ("Building, Dwelling, Thinking," and "the Thing") in which things are: finally granted the honor and dignity of a special inquiry, and where a yet unheard word is told with respect to their being. As Levinas might rephrase it, the layers of sedimentation through which, in the things, the Saying of transcendence has consigned itself to the said are finaIly reduced; the said is unsaid and broken open through the interruption of the possibility of coherent thematization produced by the nearing ofthe Fourfold.
The unsaying ofthe said coincides with the novelty ofHeidegger's results in their standing out against the traditionalism ofthe example(s) employed. To illustrate the thingness of things, in "The Thing" Heidegger chooses a rather obvious case of things, an artifact -a jug. As a container made of a certain type of soil, a jug certainly requires external production. Although a description in terms of "self-supporting independence" (T 166) may help to differentiate things from technological objects (in which case a jug may not be considered a thing, but an artificial object), Heidegger promptly dismisses such a characterization as unable to reach the essence ofthings when asserting that "from the product' s self-support, there is no way that leads to the thingness of the thing" (T 167). The dismissal, which liberates things from any productivistic determination, 6 indicates their essence to be lying elsewhere -in the case of the jug, in its being avessei (T 169), whereas its being brought into existence is merely a consequence ofthis primordial being.
The relinquishment of the productivistic interpretation, while releasing from the necessity to consider the affiliation between techne and technology in the determination ofthe nature ofthings (that is, products are things, and not simply objects), also blurs the traditional distinction between art and physis, ultimately allowing for a reinscription within artifacts (whether artworks or artificial products) of characters originally recognized only to natural entities; the differentiation among various types ofthings -artificial, mineral, vegetal, animal; the fact that the universe of things does not constitute a homogeneous horizon is not abolished by Heidegger, but will be regained later at a level different than and uncontaminated by a unilateral determination in terms ofthe notion ofhuman agency. More fundamentally, however, a yet unheard suggestion is implied in Heidegger' s claim that "the jug is not avesseI because it was made; rather, the jug had to be made because it is this holding vessel" (T 168): as if there were something archaically imperative in the essence of things that mandates a course of action; almost as ifthings were able to place a demand that can go unanswered only at the price of a transgression of their being. The path for an understanding of the thingness of things different from most Western tradition, and from Heidegger's previous approach to it, is opened up.
Reverent, as usual, to the fact that "it is language that teIls us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature," Heidegger' s long-established passion for etymologies retraces the semantic origin of the word 'Ding,' the thing, in the high-German term ' thing. '7 The reconstruction, more essential than merely "the accidents of an etymological game" (T 124), reveals that originally the word ' thing' denoted a gathering (T 174); it is such an event of gathering that Heidegger assunles as the being of things. A thing is a thing, rather than an object, insofar as it gatherswhen it gathers, the thing things (T 174).
The novel, awkward expression, "the thing things," indicates more than a tautology or a duplication of reality; it announces the self-temporalization of the thing -by thinging, the thing becomes an event. Heidegger offers various illustrations ofthe eventuation ofthings -a bridge (BDT), a jug (T), a tree, 8 a threshold (again, L). Their eventuation consists in bringing together das Geviert, the Fourfold, the "simple oneness ofthe four" (BDT 150): earth and sky, divinities and mortals? Although the Fourfold is a "primal oneness" by which the Four belong together in one (BDT 149), "enfolded into a single fourfold" (T 173), this oneness (Einfalt) is not unity (Einheit), but rather a preservation and unfolding ofthe differences of its participants. lO Possibly in spite of Heidegger's own intentions, the nearing of the Fourfold brought about by the thinging of things discloses a form of alterity comparable to, although necessarily not identical with, the otherness which Levinas retraces in persons, but is unwilling to recognize in things, and which Heidegger does not thernatize as alterity, neither in persons, nor in things, because uninterested in the thematization of ethical othemess. It is the presence of such alterity that enables a discourse on things in tenns of their faciality, therefore allowing for the possibility of the development of an ethics of things.
The alterity of the thing that Heidegger' s account discloses is revealed in a signifying that is not exhausted in its signification. In its thinging, the thing is not immediate presence; in its gathering, it intends beyond itself toward a Fourfold, which, by its same nature, indicates beyond itself-multiplicity in oneness; oneness in multiplicity; sky, mortals, and divinities in the earth; earth, mortals, and divinities in the sky; earth, sky, and divinities in the mortals; earth, sky, and mortals in the divinities. There is always something other to the thing than what its appearance immediately reveals; something which transcends its immediate signification, and yet can only emerge in the immanence of that very first appearance. Only in virtue of this signification beyond itself is an entity to be considered a thing, rather than an object. As Heidegger anxiously remarks, however, the description ofthings in tenns of alterity does not reduce the universe to a synlbolic order. In its intending beyond itself, a symbol "expresses something that strictly speaking does not belong to it" (BDT 153); its essence lies elsewhere than in the symbol. Conversely, the being of the thing consists precisely in the immanence of its transcendence, in its, so to speak, transimmanence. In other words, alterity is not simply intended by the thing: it is the thing -schizophrenia ofthings, which, in their being near to us and yet far away from us, immanent and yet not reducible to, and exhaustible in, the immanence ofsimple presence, reveal an idiosyncratic order of signification -the order of things.
Within such an order, things act as the aletheic powers of disclosure of other things, so that, as in Heidegger' s example, "the banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream" (BDT 152). From being conditioned by the context, the horizon, whether pragmatic (BT) or artistic (OWA), within which they appear, things achieve the new ontological status of conditioners, both ofthemselves and ofwhat is gathered within them, in neamess to them; in the first place, the mortals. As Heidegger explicitly remarks, "in the strict sense of the Gennan word bedingt, we are the be-thinged, the conditioned ones. We have left behind us the presumption of all unconditionedness" (T 181). The suspicion of a transcendental foundation of things, still present in
Being and Time and in On the Origin o/the Work 0/Ar~is vanished through the achievement ofthe new perspective on things -a thingly perspective, as Heidegger acknowledges when claiming that "the thing things the world" (T 181). The recognition is striking, if compared to previous meditations, where only through the world could the being of things be disclosed.
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The conditioning things impose, however, is of a peculiar kind, in its receiving its determination not by the conditioner, but by the conditioned. Philosophical foundationalism introverts itselfundermining the solidity ofthe foundation, exposing it to the shaling and shattering provoked by the intrusion ofalterity, and thereby denouncing the impracticability ofthe foundationalist approach. Despite the gathering performed by things, what is disclosed renlains itself -the square a square, the castle a castle, and mortals are not transfigured in their standing in front of the divinities. The lack of transfiguration, that is, the absence of a sublimation of the disclosed within an order pre-established by the disclosure; the refusal to attribute to things a meaning previous to their own donation of meaning preserves the alterity of that which is thus gathered. Since gathering does not achieve unity or assimilation, it is itself shaped, that is, determined, by the differences that it brings together. The way the bridge gathers and the way another thing, even another bridge, gathers, do not result into homogeneous configurations, Heidegger wams. II The landscape which the Fourfold originates remains varied, its lines of flight always directing toward new constellations of gathering ofthe Fourfold. Although the gathering is the Same, the modality and consequently the results of the gathering are different, because "we can only say 'the same' ifwe think difference. It is in the carrying out and settling ofdifferences that the gathering nature ofsameness comes to light."I2 Alterity is thus preserved throughout: in the gatherers, which are not assimilated into one single kind of Being; in the gathered, which are allowed to be in their own way; and in the modality of gathering which, although the same, is always different.
By staging this complex relation of reciprocal conditioning, the thing brings the Four one near to the other in that being that the thing itself iso What the thing as gatherer founds is not reality, but, analogously to Levinas' s understanding of ethics, the place of a relationship. "We should leam to recognize that things themselves are the places, do not merely belong in space," Heidegger writes.
13 According to Heidegger, aspace is a "place cleared or freed for settlement and lodging" (BDT 154). By opening up a space, things offer a lodging for the gathering ofthe Fourfold. Analogously to language, as described by Heidegger, things become the abode of Being; in their being withdrawn from the penetration of all speculations, they disclose a hollow, a niche in which the Fourfold can nestle (T 180). Rather than transcendental founders, things are topological founders: they open up aspace that allows for a vicinity. Far from abolishing famess, however, "neamess preserves famess" (T 178), because "neamess brings near -draws nigh to one another -the far and, indeed, as the far" (T 177-178). In the nearing, none of the participants needs any transcendental foundation, because each of them exists prior to the relation itself; and yet, each can achieve its own signification only within the space described by the relation.
Through the relation which is thus instituted the earth, the sky, and the divinities renounce the indetermination of what Levinas names the il y a, the anonymous being that constitutes the mythical dinlension of existence,14 and enter a determined relation with mortals and with each other. In things the earth, the sky, the divinities are not "the impersonal, faceless gods with which it is impossible to speak" (TI 142), as Levinas claims with direct reference to Heidegger, but rather they become the gods ofthe relation, ofthe place, ofthe abode that the thing itself is -pagan gods, maybe, but, as several non JudeoChristian traditions attest, not thereby faceless, impersonal or indeterminate.
As already prefigured by the scission of things from any economy of production, the complexity and multiplicity of relations characterizing the thinging of the thing precludes any classification of things (whether fabricated, artistically produced, or naturally grown) established on the ground of the relation human beings entertain with them, as if such a relation were the archaic condition of their being. On the contrary, the differing of things from one another becomes a direct function of their own way of thinging, of their own way of eventuating the relation, whereas all different things are nevertheless gathered in the commonality of the same thingness because oftheir hosting the Fourfold. Although differing among themselves, the qualification ofthings can thus be applied to both the jug and the desk, the bridge and the plough. "But tree and pond, too, brook and hill, are things, each in its own way. Things, each thinging from time to time in its own way, are heron and roe, deer, horse and bulle Things, each thinging and each staying in its own way, are mirror and clasp, book and picture, crown and cross" (T 182), bread and wine (L 205).
That is, things are conceived ofbroadly enough to encompass, yet without homogenization, not only artifacts, excluded from the consideration ofphysis, but also natural entities, excluded from the consideration ofZeuge as unfolded in Being and Time. 15 Only because ofthe primordial relation ofthe Fourfold can things be classified as artifacts or natural entities, which are peculiar modes in which the relation configures itself. Rather than resulting in generality, the denomination 'things' enhances and legitimizes the possibility of differences -not the chaotic proliferation ofunrelated multiplicities, but rather the fertile richness of differences within the same, because the ground for the determination of what the thing is has become the thing itself in its alterity. Each thing remains other in hosting the Fourfold in its peculiar way: otherthan the Fourfold, otherthan any otherthing, and otherthan the mortals. The separateness ofthings from one another and from what they gather is the open circle they describe, which traditional metaphysics has mistaken for their extensionality; it is the continuous tending and dis-tending ofa difference that cannot rest upon itself, unless it loses itself. When staticity replaces eventuation, the thing undergoes an absolutization. The scenario, then, is the well-known panorama of naturalistic realism, which considers things as objects in antithesis to the subjective conscience.
In these later essays the thingness ofthings has been completely achieved, and has been achieved as alterity: unconditional alterity, because things are unconditioned; absolute alterity, because the alterity ofthings does not stern from an oppositional confrontation with mortals, or divinities, which are rather appropriated by and relocated within the alterity ofthings. Undeniably, the alterity things display according to Heidegger' s interpretation of their being lacks the most fundamental feature qualifying Levinas' s other (the Otherpar excellence) as Other: despite its signifying beyond itselftoward the Fourfold, the alterity of things is not their transcendence, because transcendence implies vertical directionality, height, ascension. In "Language" Heidegger states that "the unitary Fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and divinities ... is stayed in the thinging ofthings" (L 199), where the preposition in, locating the thinging in the thing itself, cannot be ignored. The ringing of the Fourfold is not a unidirectional movement, whether from the bottom upward or vice versa. Rather, the ringing bears closer resemblance to a circular dance (T 180), in which the direction ofthe ringing moves back and forth, in a deflection that de-centers (but does not raise toward transcendence) the origin of the movement itself. In its ringillg the circle is open, abolishing beginning and end, inside and outside. Things are always open to becoming other than themselves, and always resistant to fixation, determination, definition, and therefore, precisely because of the lack of a hard core at their center, vulnerable to appropriation, exploitation, desacralization. At any moment the dynamics ofthe mirroring may privilege one component over the others, in an overflowing of significations rendering the temporalization of the thing varied, and the meaning of each thing continuously open to new configurations and disclosures. Rather than in their being transcendent, the alterity of things lies in their perennial difference and differing from themselves and from one another (maybe what, with a Derridean term, could be named their differance), which render their nature so evanescent, so frail, and so difficult to reach to any philosophical, even phenomenological, description.
The absence of the dimension of height, brought about by the decenteredness of things, is balanced by the presence of another dimensionthat ofbreadth drifting into depth. It is the breadth/depth originating from the temporalization of the ringing of the Fourfold, from the difference and differing of things from the Fourfold and from other things. The open circle the mirror-play ofthe Fourfold describes, which Heidegger qualifies as a play bonding in freedom (T 179), constitutes the breadth of things, which traditional metaphysics equates with their spatial dimension. In its being a mutual betrothing of its participants,16 such breadth is traversed by lines of inscriptions recording the temporalization ofthe Fourfold itself. The elements ofthe Fourfold enter the thing endowed with stories oftheir own, coming to them from previous relations, from previous constellations, from previous places of encounter they have entered, from their having witnessed the anarchic past preceding the origin oftheir relation as Fourfold. These stories do they entrust to the thing in its ,enabling the intersection of "the onefold fourfold into a single space-time" (T 174): by thinging the thing enriches itself with an irretrievable past granting the thing its depth. Things ward the past, becoming the shrine of the past -of the origins. It is this very past, which things bear inscribed in the folds of their breadth, that offers things depth and the possibility of being subjects of narration: as all good storytellers have known ever since a long time ago, things tell stories, as much as they are material for stories. Although there is no height in things, certainly there is the alterity brought by the depth of the irretrievability of the paste Steeped in being, nevertheless things indicate an otherwise-than-being which, inviolable, inviolate, and yet always menaced by violation, is enshrined and expressedwithin the folds of their being.
The fragility and precariousness of the alterity of things is understood by Heidegger hirnself, when he notices how, endowed with a modesty and unpretentiousness (T 182) bereaving them of the power to resist domination, things are delicate entities always on the verge of disappearance into objectification -entities whose othemess is dissolved in the heteronomy of their being a representation: a Gegen-stand and a Vor-stellung. I? Yet, if let be present in their thinging, things place a demand on mortals to which mortals can only co-respond, releasing the autonomous power of initiative, making themselves passive and responsive. "We are called by the things as things" (T 181), Heidegger claims, acknowledging the reality of their demand, and providing suggestions on how to comply with such an appeal. In connection with such an appeal, he wams, the role of mortals becomes crucial, since things do not appear as things "without the vigilance ofmortals. The first step toward such vigilance is the step back from the thinking that merely represents" (T 181). However, vigilance cannot be a voluntaristic, that is, subjectivistic, shift ofattitude. Rather, "the step back takes up its residence in a co-responding which, appealed to in the world' s being by the world' s being, answers within itselfto that appeal" (T 181-182). Meditating on this vigilant co-responding (whose laws are dictated heteronomously) under the name of dwelling, Heidegger describes it as the fourfold activity of "saving the earth, ... receiving the sky, ... awaiting the divinities, ... initiating the mortals" (BDT 151). The ultimate significance of this quadrupIe performance is without doubts: to dweIl means to care for the Fourfold.
I8 But caring for the Fourfold can be accomplished only if mortals care for things, because things are the receptacle ofthe Fourfold. And things can be the receptacle only ifthey can be let be in their thingness.
The demand, which commands a different approach to things, finds thus its proper answer in the notion of Gelassenheit, which offers "the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way."19 Neither laxity nor pennissiveness, but rather relinquishment ofthe metaphysical will to power, and therefore acting "which is yet no activity" (DT 61), Gelassenheit means to abandon oneselfto things, to let things be in the alterity oftheir mirror-play which, expropriating the nlortals, appropriates them to things. Only through this abandonment to things are mortals enabled to locate themselves within things, and be appropriated by them. In other words, mortals are committed to things by things themselves, which, through the mirror-play they host, in turn commit themselves to mortals -the relation is that of a mirrored commitment.
In Discourse on Thinking Heidegger asserts that the relation between what he calls die Gegnet, that-which-regions, and Gelassenheit, as well as that between die Gegnet and the thing, "can be thought neither as ontic nor as ontological" (DT 76). What kind of relation is this relation, which, by extension, encompasses also the relation between Gelassenheit and things? Although Heidegger' s word is silent, this relation could modestly be called ethics, if, as in Levinas, ethics is understood as the place of love for what remains and insists on remaining other. Things thus impose an imperative which comes close to an ethical demand. They request an act oflove -ethics -which lets things be as things, and which therefore opens up aspace for the hosting ofthe Fourfold. Heidegger, however, will never explicitly thematize the ethical character of such an act.
By welcoming things as things, mortals are welcomed within the things. How to enact the welcome which alone enables things to be in their othemess, and mortals to dwell by them? How to enact Gelassenheit? Neither Heidegger nor Levinas, when taken individually, provide their reader with a direct response: Levinas loves, but not things; Heidegger thematizes things, but does not love them enough. What neither can achieve separately might be obtained through an exposure of one to the other -exposure which may contanlinate the purity of their thought, but may enable the thematization of an ethics of things. Confronted with such an ethics, servant girls might finally stop their millenary laughter.
